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THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
In Re Japanese Electronic Products
Antitrust Litigation,
[1980-21 Trade Cases (CCH) 163,421 (3rd Cir., July 7, 1980)
In In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Seventh
Amendment does not guarantee a right to trial by jury in complex cases
where a jury will be unable to "perform its task of rational decisionmaking
with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the relevant legal
standards."2 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Seitz based the decision upon
the rationale that a trial before an uncomprehending jury would violate Fifth
Amendment due process rights. Therefore, in exceptional cases, district
judges may exercise limited discretion to balance Fifth and Seventh
Amendment rights and deny a jury trial.'
The case is undeniably complex. It involves twenty-four defendants' and
"close to one hundred alleged co-conspirators,"5 ranging from .major and
minor Japanese companies, such as Mitsubishi Corporation, the umbrella
Japanese trading company, and Sony Corporation, to international giants
such as General Electric Company and N.V. Philips Gloeilamperfabrieken.5
After nine years of discovery, the case has generated millions of documents
and over 100,000 pages of depositions., The trial court has predicted that the
actual trial would last a year.7
Nor are the issues simple. The litigation began in 1970 when National
Union Electric Corporation (NUE) charged several Japanese. competitors
1. In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, [1980-21 TRADE
CASES (CCH) 63,421 (3rd Cir., 1980) [hereinafter JEPA].
2. Id. at 76,198.
3. Id. at 76,198, 76,200. The Seventh Amendment provides in part that "In suits
at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." The Fifth Amend-
ment guarantees no deprivation of "life, liberty or property, without due process of
law."
4. Id. at 76,186-87. There are ten principal defendants, including two United
States companies: Sears, Roebuck and Company and Motorola Corporation. The re-
maining ten defendants are subsidiaries of the Japanese principals. Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp., 478 F. Supp. 889, 893 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (district
court opinion by Judge Becker, reversed by instant case).
5. 478 F. Supp. at 893.
6. There were in excess of twenty million documents, most of which required
translation, produced for discovery. Id. at 894-95.
(133)
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with antitrust and international trade violations.' In 1974, Zenith Radio
Corporation entered the fray naming all of the NUE defendants, adding
several new ones, including Sears, Roebuck, and Company, and repeating the
allegations of dumping, conspiracy and intent to destroy domestic competi-
tion in the American market. However, Zenith claimed damages for a longer
period, 1966 through 1978,1 expanded the relevant markets beyond television
to other electronic equipment, and alleged violations of price discrimination' °
and of § 7 of the Clayton Act." There are, in addition, counterclaims alleging
Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act violations, as well as charges of
sham litigation against Zenith and approximately thirty other co-
conspirators. 2 The two suits were consolidated in 1975 before the federal
district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.'3
Plaintiffs NUE and Zenith demanded a jury trial. Judge Becker, in a
"thorough and scholarly opinion" denied defendants' motion to strike the
demands." In so doing, the court certified its order for interlocutory appeal.
The Third Circuit obtained jurisdiction by permitting the appeal to review
7. Id. at 895.
8. NUE charged its competitors with violations of the 1916 Antidumping Act, 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1976), by maintaining lower prices for televisions sold in the United States
than for comparable models sold in Japan. NUE further alleged that the dumping
practices are part of a conspiracy which included over ninety conspirators worldwide,
in violation of §§ 1, 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. H§ 1, 2 (1976), and § 73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976). The Wilson Act applies Sherman Act proscrip-
tions to import trade. NUE seeks treble damages under the Antidumping Act and
under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The 1916 Antidumping Act has
never been construed or interpreted in a trial situation, and the Wilson Act is "rarely
used and interpreted" in litigation. 478 F. Supp. at 897.
9. NUE's claim only covers the period between 1966-1970.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimina-
tion among American purchasers.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Zenith charges defendants Matsushita and Sanyo Cor-
porations with violating § 7 by acquiring interests in domestic producers of consumer
electronic products previously held by American companies.
12. See Sherman Act supra note 8, at § 1, 2. See Robinson-Patman Act, supra
note 10, at §§ 1, 2, 13(a). See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
379-80 (1973) (sham litigation). The charges include territorial allocations, horizontal
and vertical price-fixing schemes, key dealer preferences, and price discrimination.
13. In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 565
(Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1975). The court also denied Sony defendants' motion for a sepa-
rate trial. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,187.
14. 478 F. Supp. 889. Chief Judge Seitz termed the opinion "thorough and scholar-
ly." 1980-2 TRADE CASES at 76,187. If anything, his comment is an understatement.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also noted that "Judge Becker's scholarly
decision is over one hundred pages in length and is possibly the only decision with its
own table of contents." In Re U.S. Financial Securities Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d
411, 418 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3694 (April 28, 1980).
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two issues: whether the Seventh Amendment must apply to statutory
litigation and whether complexity of suit is not a constitutionally permissible
reason for striking jury demands. 5
Judge Becker's lengthy district court opinion concluded that the
antitrust laws do not themselves, either expressly or impliedly, guarantee
trial by jury. Thus, the issue becomes a Seventh Amendment question. The
court rejected the ingenious historical argument that extraordinary complex-
ity renders a suit equitable in nature, and therefore, not subject to the
Seventh Amendment requirements." The cornerstone of the district court's
ruling was the belief, or assumption, that even in the most difficult,
demanding issues, a jury is at least as capable as a judge of reaching a sound
decision.
There is no reason to believe that any of the jury's functions are less
important in complex and protracted litigation than in smaller and
simpler cases. Indeed, as 'big' cases proliferate and consume an
increasing share of our judicial resources, the survival of the peculiar
qualities of justice traditionally delivered by juries . . . may depend on
the continued availability of juries in such cases.
Once the court accepted this premise, it inevitably concluded that there
could be no basis to the claim that a trial by jury could be "fundamentally
unfair," thereby denying Fifth Amendment due process rights." The court
was swayed by the practical difficulties inherent in implementing a
15. The issue "Is our decision that the demand for jury not be strict in this case
correct?" was certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). The Appeals Court
agreed with the district court that the jury trial issue meets the statutory requirement
that the question present a "controlling question of law." 478 F. Supp. at 943-46.
16. Although the Supreme Court has held that some aspects of the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial should reflect the state of the common law in 1791,
when that amendment was adopted, see, e.g. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), it
has not confined the right to causes of action recognized at common law in 1791. The
Court has applied the guarantee to suits at law, including those based upon statutory
causes of action. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974). Appellants de-
veloped an interesting argument that the English Chancellor took jurisdiction in equi-
ty over cases in accounting, other financial cases and some issues which may have been
relatively complex. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,193-96. The Seventh Amendment does
not apply to suits in equity. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 445-47 (1830)
(Story, J.); see Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 464 (1962).
17. 478 F. Supp. at 942, 935-42; see 609 F.2d at 427-31 (jury as competent as
judge); see, e.g., P. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Alloca-
tion of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REv. 47, 53 (1977).
18. 478 F. Supp. at 936.
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balancing test. It feared that in the long run, broad discretion in determining
complexity might dilute the right to jury trial.'9 Finally, the court objected to
the due process argument because the trial judge can prevent an irrational
verdict through its power to direct a verdict or to grant a judgment n.o.v. °
On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the findings of the
district court on the question of due process. The Court of Appeals agreed with
Judge Becker that there is no statutory basis in either the Clayton Act or the
Sherman Act for the right to a jury trial." Therefore, the constitutional issue
could not be avoided. The Third Circuit also agreed that the fact that there
might have been equitable jurisdiction over some complex cases in England,
when the Seventh Amendment was adopted, is not a "persuasive reason for
incorporating into the Seventh Amendment the policies and probable actions
of the English Chancellor of 1791.""l
However, the court reached the contrary conclusion that a given case
might be so complex as to elude the intellectual grasp of a jury, which in turn
would result in a denial of the parties' constitutional right to due process. 23
This result creates a conflict between the Third and the Ninth Circuits. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found Judge Becker's opinion highly
persuasive when it found no violation of due process in In re U.S. Financial
Securities Litigation.'
The Third Circuit began with an historic analysis of the constitutional
right to a jury, noting that since 1830 the Supreme Court has.applied the
jury guarantee to almost any suit at law, including those based on statutory
causes of action. 5 The guarantee does not apply to suits in equity or
admiralty. ' Antitrust and antidumping suits are legal in nature; "prior cases
have always assumed that the seventh amendment [sic] guarantees a jury
trial in antitrust suits . . ."' The issue becomes one of whether complexity
may constitute an exception to the general rule, which all of the parties to
the instant suit agreed normally applies to antitrust suits.
Judge Seitz then turned to the Supreme Court's enigmatic footnote to its
opinion in Ross v. Bernhard.8 There, the plaintiff in a derivative stockholder's
19. Id. at 931-33.
20. Id. at 937-38; see 609 F.2d at 431.
21. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,192.
22. Id. at 76,196.
23. Id. at 76,198.
24. 609 F.2d at 411, 427-31.
25. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 446-47 (1830).
26. 415 U.S. at 193-94.
27. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,192; see Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Alu-
minum & Chemical Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 23 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978);
See Beacon Theaters, supra note 16, at 504.
28. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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action claimed the right to trial by jury. The Second Circuit denied the claim
on the grounds that the claim was predominantly equitable in nature. The
Court reversed, granting the trial by jury and relegating the issue of jury
competence to a footnote:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is determined by
considering, first, the premerger custom with reference to such ques-
tions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries. (emphasis added)9
There is wide disagreement as to the precise meaning of the Ross
footnote.' Many courts have employed the footnote as the definitive Seventh
Amendment test, arguing that if an issue is not legal under Ross, it is not
29. Id. Judge Becker argues persuasively that in Ross, the issue of whether the
case was too complicated for a jury was raised at every level of the courts. The district
court found that the issues were not too complicated; the Court of Appeals thought that
derivative suits might be too complex, but based its decision on different grounds be-
cause "the Seventh Amendment does not ask that we assess the suitability of a given
type of litigation for jury trial." See Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 403 F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
396 U.S. 531 (1970). Notwithstanding this history, the Ross Court determined that the
claims were at least partly legal without any mention of the issue of jury comprehen-
sion in the body of its opinion. 396 U.S. at 542. Thus, although the issue was raised
directly, the Court did not accept the invitation to resolve it. "The omission of any
discussion of the jury's ability to deal with the complex issues prsented in Ross implies
strongly that the Court did not deem it relevant to the Seventh Amendment issue
there." 478 F. Supp. at 927-28. Furthermore, the Court has not addressed the question
of the status of the third Ross criterion despite twice having decided cases in which the
lower court opinion relied upon explicit applications of the footnote to grant a jury
trial. See Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977), affd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978);
Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), af'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974).
30. Several commentators have dismissed the third part of the Ross test as an
aberration, because the Court placed it in a footnote and failed to cite any precedent for
such a major departure. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 454 (3rd ed. 1976); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in
the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw U.L. REV. 486, 526 (1975). Others
have recently taken the opposite position. See, e.g., Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in
Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898, 911-14 (1979); Note, The Right to an
Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10
CONN. L. REv. 775, 776-83 (1978); Note, Congressional Provision for Non-Jury Trial
Under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 411-12 (1973) ("long and disting-
uished lineage" of the third part of Ross test in traditional resort to equity for "pro-
cedural inadequacies").
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subject to the Seventh Amendment." Others have either questioned its scope
or ignored it entirely.2 The Supreme Court itself has refused to elaborate.3
Judge Becker held that Ross might not be read as "requiring or permitting"
consideration of the ability of juries in determining whether the right to a
jury extends to matters committed by Congress or the common law to the
federal district courts.' His construction is unique and in direct contravention
of the literal language in Ross.
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the footnote is too
brief to "authorize a major departure from the traditional construction of the
Seventh Amendment.' ' 5 It did, however, hold that the third prong of the Ross
test "plainly recognizes the significance, for purposes of the Seventh
Amendment, of the possibility that a suit may be too complex for a jury. '36
Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme Court left open
the possibility that the range of suits subject to the Seventh Amendment may
be limited by the practical abilities and limitations of jurors and that the
Court has not precluded such a ruling.37 Thus, the appeals court did not use
the footnote as a test, but seized upon the Court's language as enabling, or
permissive of, authorization of the fashioning of a new constitutional
balancing test.
The Court of Appeals propounded a three-pronged constitutional
argument: the primary value of due process in fact-finding procedures is that
of minimizing the risk of erroneous decisions;' a jury's conclusion must rest
"solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing; '39 and a jury
31. Several courts have employed Ross as the test in denying a trial by jury on the
ground of size and complexity. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D.
702, 712-14 (S.D. Cal. 1977). In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp.
99, 104-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974).
Others have employed the test in granting trial by jury. See, e.g., 549 F.2d at 953;
Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir., 1975); 467 F.2d at 1118; Jones v.
Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Radial Lip Machine, Inc. v. Internation-
al Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (Ross clearly directs courts to inquire
into jury competence).
32. See 609 F.2d 411; Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 225 n.25 (4th Cir.
1978), United States v. J.B. Williams Company, Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 428-29 (2d Cir.
1974); SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978)
(ignoring Ross footnote entirely).
33. See Pons and Loether, supra note 29.
34. 478 F. Supp. at 926.
35. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,193.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
39. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,271 (1970).
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cannot base its decision upon that which it does not understand." The law
presumes that a jury will decide rationally. A decision without understand-
ing leads to the conclusion that "due process precludes trial by jury when a
jury is unable to perform this task with a reasonable understanding of the
evidence and the legal rules.""1
But the court's argument did not end there. If the action is one at law, a
conflict results between the Fifth and Seventh Amendments. Such a result
should require a balancing test between the competing constitutional
provisions.' 2 In effect, the competition is between the right to a fair trial
under the Fifth Amendment, and the right to a jury trial under the Seventh.
The due process objections "implicate values of fundamental importance'
3
because: (1) jury verdicts will be erratic and completely unpredictable; (2)
factual determinations will be inaccurate, therefore legal remedies will not
be consistent with the purposes of the law; and (3) jury decisions which are
not based upon a sufficient understanding of the evidence and legal rules will
defeat the objectives of most rules of evidence and procedure. The net result
undermines the ability of the court to render basic justice."
Judge Seitz balanced the loss of the right to a trial by jury in a case too
complex for a jury to comprehend against the effective absence of due process,
i.e., a fair trial. He found that the same "fundamental concerns" are not
implicated. He stressed the ability of federal courts to provide fair trials
without a jury requirement in equitable and maritime actions. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court refuses to construe the Fourteenth Amendment as
requiring the states to preserve the right to a civil jury trial.'" The essence of
the court's reasoning, then, is that where due process rights are implicated,
there is, by definition, a greater possibility that a just decision will not be
reached, but where, under similar circumstances the right to a jury trial is
denied, there remains a substantial likelihood that a court may reach a fair
decision. The essence of the balancing test is the extent to which "fun-
damental concerns" are implicated by the competing provisions.
This reasoning is persuasive, but only if one accepts the underlying
assumption that an individual judge is more likely to be capable of
understanding the legal rules and evidence which are presented in complex
40. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,197.
41. Id.
42. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
43. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,197.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937); Hardware Dealers
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Melancon v. McKeithen,
345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), aftd, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), 409 U.S. 1098 (1972).
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litigation. Unfortunately, the issue ultimately is resolved by faith or instinct,
rather than through the logical use of data, which are limited.,6 The Court of
Appeals recognized the special strengths of a jury as decisionmaker.
Decisionmaking by "black box"'7 may temper harsh legal results with
equitable justice. Jury verdicts may serve to legitimize decisions which
require a determination of degree, for example, in "drawing the line" between
negligence and recklessness. Finally, the jury may provide a check or
restraint on judicial power.4 8 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found it
difficult to justify these advantages in a context in which the jury's decision
has absolutely no basis in fact or in law.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit emphasized the probable effect of
the constraints which operate upon a jury in complex cases; the court focused
upon the constraint of the impact of prolonged trials. Lengthy trials can
distract concentration by disrupting careers and personal lives and can weed
out professionals who may be more qualified to comprehend complex issues.'9
Additionally, the court noted that juries are not likely to be familiar with the
technical subject matter of complex cases. This factor, coupled with their
unfamiliarity with the process of 'civil litigation, may well result in further
confusion.' In contrast, an individual judge might be expected to allocate the
time required for the trial without undue personal disruption. He may be
46. 609 F.2d at 430 (little practical research on jury's ability to comprehend); see
Comment, 10 CONN. L. REV. supra note 30, at 777, 786 (statistical analysis of jury
selection process in complex litigation demonstrating elimination of disproportionate
number of college educated jurors, or those employed in technical or managerial fields);
Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Jun. 478, 483 (1976)
(college educated jurors tend to have higher comprehension than others, many jurors
confused by judge's instructions).
47. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76, 198. Judge Becker accorded the "black-box" advan-
tages great weight. 478 F. Supp. at 938 ("results without reasons"). The theory of the
'"lack-box" is that the jury receives input from the trial and produces a decision by an
unknown and unknowable process. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 57-59
(1977) ("a responsible agency"); Higgenbotham, supra note 17, at 56-57.
48. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76, 198; see 478 F. Supp. at 942; Higgenbotham, supra
note 17, at 58-60.
49. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76, 199; see Comment, 10 CONN. L. REV., supra note 30,
at 776-83.
50. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76, 199. This point is supported by the analysis and
examples presented in Note, 92 HARV. L. REV., supra note 30, at 908-09:
Like a jury of persons who cannot see, hear, or understand English, a jury com-
posed of non-economists or nonbusiness persons may well be unable to grasp evi-
dence in an antitrust case presented in technical language with which it has no
familiarity, such as evidence concerning cross-elasticity of demand, market power,
exclusionary leasing, subordinated debentures, interfaces, and reverse engineer-
ing. Id. at 908.
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neither more intelligent than a jury nor more familiar with highly technical
subject matter, but he will have had sufficient exposure to the legal process.
He should be equipped to assess the evidence accurately (specifically the
opinions of experts) to segregate issues, and to apply complex legal standards
to the facts. Finally, even where a case proves too complex for a judge, the
addition of a jury would not improve the solution. The presence of a jury
would not relieve the judge of the need to understand the issues in order to
guide the jury and to rule on motions.51
The trial court considered the power of the trial judge to prevent
irrational verdicts by granting or denying motions for a directed verdict or
for a judgement n.o.v. to be a sufficient safeguard against an uncomprehend-
ing jury.2 The Court of Appeals rejected this position of the district court.
These procedural devices afford inadequate protection because the standards
to support such motions are extremely high. The court may not take the
verdict from the jury where the evidence might reasonably support a verdict
for either side.' Nor is there any assurance under those standards that the
verdict rests exclusively upon the legal rules and evidence from trial."
The appellate court feared the potential for abuse of the discretionary
power it would vest with trial judges. The Third Circuit recognized the need
to prescribe guidelines to prevent confusion when the new test is applied.
Therefore, the court imposes a high standard:
It is not enough that trial to the court would be preferable. The
complexity of a suit must be so great that it-renders the suit beyond the
ability of a jury to decide by rational means with a reasonable
understanding of the evidence and applicable legal rules. Moreover, the
district court should not deny a jury trial if by severance of multiple
claims, thoughtful use of the procedures suggested in the Manual for
Complex Litigation, or other methods, the court can enhance a jury's
capabilities or can reduce the complexity of a suit sufficiently to bring it
within the ability of a jury to decide. Due process should allow denials of
jury trials only in exceptional cases.5
District courts should consider three factors in determining if a case is
too complex for a jury: (1) overall size; (2) legal and conceptual difficulty, and;
(3) inseparability of distinct components. Overall size is indicated by the
51. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76,199.
52. 478 F. Supp. at 938.
53. See Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3rd Cir. 1978) (court may enter judg-
ment against any party that has not submitted at least a "minimum quantity" of evi-
dence necessary for jury to decide reasonably in its favor).
54. JEPA, supra note 1, at 76, 200; see 397 U.S. at 271.
55. Id. at 76, 200.
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estimated length of trial, the amount of evidence, and the number of issues
which will require individual consideration. The conceptual difficulty is
reflected by the amount of expert testimony and the probable length and
detail of jury instructions. The difficulty the jury might have in segregating
distinct components of the case is indicated by the number of "separately
disputed issues related to single transactions or items of proof."' As a final
safeguard, district courts which deny a jury trial on these grounds must
make explicit findings on the dimensions of complexity.
This decision may well herald a new era in the conduct of complex
litigation. The majority consciously recognized the potential impact of its
departure. This recognition is reflected in the majority's careful attempt to
limit the use of the new rule by the prescription of stringent standards and
by the formulation of an explicit test.
Judge Gibbons dissented. He would have vacated leave to take appeal
from the district court's ruling because the case was "hypothetical" and,
therefore, not ripe for decision on the issue of whether any single case could
be too complex for jury trial. His argument is that the case could have been
rendered comprehensible by reducing it to the "separate components that it
would have presented at common law." 57 Admittedly, this approach would
result in the loss of economy and efficiency. Judge Gibbons conceded that his
decision would be close,- but had he reached the merits, he would have
affirmed the district court. He could not conceive of a case too complex for a
jury; he disapproved of permitting trial courts to exercise what might
become, in effect, unreviewable discretion. He would prefer the majority's
rule if interlocutory review were available as a matter of right. 9 The latter
suggestion would appear to be meritorious, in view of the constitutional right
to be abrogated and of the requirement that the rule be invoked only in
exceptional cases. If the courts adhere to the latter requirement, the
appellate court would not be overburdened with interlocutory appeals on the
issue. If they do not, and invoke the rule frequently, such frequency should
56. Id. at 76, 201.
57. Id. at 76, 203-04.
58. Id. at 76, 203 ("I dissent in this case with a good deal less confidence in my
position than in most cases in which the majority has failed to persuade me.").
59. Id. at 76, 204. See Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935)
(permitting interlocutory appeal of order staying action at law pending decision in
equity on ground stay was injunction); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S.
188, 190-92 (1942) (reaffirming Enelow after adoption of Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure); compare, e.g., Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 184
(1955) (refusing to permit interlocutory appeal of order refusing to stay action pending
arbitration because order not injunction).
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signal the need for strict, uniform appellate review because a multiplicity of
cases could hardly be termed "exceptional."
The decision in Japanese Electronic Products is significant. It signals a
major departure from the traditional requirements for conducting complex
litigation. Fortunately, both Chief Judge Seitz for the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, and Judge Becker for the district court, accorded the legal and
factual issues the respect they deserve. Neither did they yield to the
temptation to launch a major initiative from the shaky platform of the Ross
footnote, nor did they resort to arcane distinctions between law and equity.
The Third Circuit's balancing test between Fifth Amendment due process
rights and Seventh Amendment jury rights is reasonable and compelling,
subject only to the very real question of whether a jury might in truth be
more subject to confusion than would a judge in complex cases, and whether
that confusion could be sufficient to amount to a violation of due process.6
1
Ideally, Congress should answer this question when the issues present
violations of the antitrust, trade, or securities statutes. Realistically, the
Supreme Court will make the determination of whether under some
circumstances the ends of justice might be served better by a single judge, or
by a collective intelligence, in which the whole might transcend the
individual limitations of the parts.
Kenneth D. Pack
60. By refusing to employ the Ross footnote as a definitive test, the Third Circuit
circumvented the issue of whether complex litigation is, by definition, equitable in
nature. Ross tests the "legal" nature of an issue and implies that issues which fail the
criteria are equitable. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. Indeed, the court's balancing test strongly
suggests that "legal" issues need not be redefined as equitable in order to avoid the
Seventh Amendment requirement. Rather, the issue is framed in terms of overriding
constitutional considerations, in this case, Fifth Amendment due process.
61. There is now a conflict between the Third and the Ninth Circuits. See 609 F.2d
411. The Court denied certiorari in U.S. Financial Securities, supra note 14, and neith-
er Zenith nor NUE has petitioned the instant decision. The issue will inevitably arise
again.
